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Introduction 
 
Two moral abilities are particularly important for living together in a democracy: firstly 
the ability of all citizens to judge and to act in accordance with their own moral 
principles; secondly, the ability to solve conflicts by means of fear-free discussions 
instead of the use of violence and the exercise of power. As research shows, both 
basic abilities, which are often summed up under the overall concept of moral 
competence, are essential for a democratic way of life and the functioning of 
democratic institutions. They are important for many things, e.g., for helping people 
in distress (not just readiness to help), for making quick decisions, learning effectively, 
for tolerating ambiguity, and for rejecting violence as a means of social change. 
Research also shows that the school promotes moral competence less effectively 
and less sustainably than is needed and seems possible today. 
 
In this editorial, I attempt to give a broad overview on the research on moral 
competence and its application in education and educational policy-making in the 
past thirty years, in which I have been personally involved. It is not a comprehensive 
handbook article, which remains to be written. 
 
Why moral competence? 
 
Socrates: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one 
man is no better than another in that respect? Menon: True.  
Socrates: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be 
better in the power of attaining it? Menon: Exactly. 
Socrates: Then according to your definition virtue would appear to be the power of 
attaining good. 1 
                                                 
1 Platon: Menon (Source: Project Gutenberg) 
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Surely, moral ideals and orientations are indispensible for moral-democratic behavior 
and for a democratic civil society. Without them we would have no idea how we 
wish to take right decisions, to live together or to be governed. Ideally they provide a 
basis for the solution of conflicts between needs and between opinions by means of 
rational reflection and free discourse, instead of the use of violence or the exercise 
of power. The Indian-American economist and philosopher Armatya Senn (2010) 
speaks of democracy through discussion. Also for the American educator Dewey 
(1964), democracy is more than a form of government and more than the sum total 
of actually existing democratic institutions; it is a life form.  
 
Yet, we need not to be concerned about ideals and orientations. As world-wide 
studies have repeatedly shown, there is an overall consensus in all classes of society, 
countries and cultures on basic moral values such as social justice, respect, 
cooperation, non-violence and democracy2. Some scholars even believe that these 
moral ideals are, at least in their core, genetically determined3. Accordingly a 
―transmission‖ of moral and democratic values is unnecessary (and, I assume, not 
agreeable with our democratic principles).  
 
What is rather lacking and seems necessary is the fostering of ―the power of attaining 
good‖, as Socrates, the great Greek philosopher, said more than two thousand years 
ago, that is, our ability to apply our moral ideals in everyday life. If this competence is 
missing, our moral ideals can turn into ethical absolutism, and, eventually, into 
morally motivated violence4. In most of us, this ability is weakly developed. This ability 
involves, above all, the ability to make judgments in accordance with our own moral 
principles and to solve conflicts non-violently through discussion, even when we deal 
with important issues, and when we face strong opposition and our fundamental 
moral principles are at stake5. We need this ability in order ―to participate in social, 
civic and working life. To be able to deal with people coming from different social 
and cultural backgrounds. To be able to cope in a constructive way with conflicts. 
To have a knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to be active as a citizen. To 
participate as much as possible in civic live at local, regional, national, European 
and global level.‖ (‗Youth in Action‘-Programs of the European Union)6 
 
                                                 
2 Lind (1986); Sen (1999); Schwarz & Bardi (2001); McFaul (2004). 
3 Bauer (2008); de Waal (2009); Moll et al. (2002). 
4 Ishida (2006). Bandura (1991, S. 74). 
5 Habermas (1983); Kohlberg (1987); Karl-Otto Apel (1990); Nussbaum (2006); Sen (2010). 
6 http://www.youthpass.eu/en/youthpass/for/youth-initiatives/learn/information/kcsocial/ 
(19.8.11) 
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Although research on moral competence is still relatively new, we already know a 
good deal about it and its significance for democratic life7. Certain relationships 
have been confirmed in numerous studies, as we show below. When this 
competence is less developed the citizens concerned are at a disadvantage in 
regard to participation in democratic decision-taking or are even completely 
excluded. Democracy itself also suffers from a lack of this competence among its 
citizens; it also suffers under an unequal distribution of the competence, as this leads 
to some citizens winning more influence than others over the process of political 
decision-taking. In a democracy the constitution guarantees every citizen a say in 
the political process. And a civil society can only function properly if every citizen 
actually makes use of his/her voice in the proceedings and is in a position to hear 
the opinions of others8.  
 
What is moral competence? 
 
Recently, the concept of ―competence‖ has become very popular and debated, 
especially through international school tests like ―PISA‖. The concept has been taken 
up in educational policy. ―With the new educational plans (of 2004) a fundamental 
paradigm shift in the binding specifications for teaching at our schools will take 
place. Whereas the educational plans of earlier generations primarily determined 
what was to be taught, the new plans allege that school should stipulate the 
competencies that children and youths must acquire.‖9  
 
However, in much of the literature the concept of competence is not clearly, if at all, 
defined. Often a variety of assumptions are made on the origin, development, 
promotion and relevance of ―competencies‖ without saying what is actually meant 
by them10. As a result of this lack of clarity there is controversy among scientists on 
the concept of competence11; and many practitioners have strong reservations 
against it, doubting that the replacement of the concept of subject knowledge 
(Fachwissen) through the concept of competence will improve the quality of the 
school system. Experts like Hans-Peter Klein, the biology educationist and chairman 
                                                 
7 An annotated list of publications can be found in the internet: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-
moral  
8 Piaget (1973); Nussbaum (2006); Sen (2010); Roth (2010); Lind et al. (2010): Nowak & Lind (2009). 
9 http://www.bildung-staerkt-menschen.de/schule_2004/bildungsplan_kurz (15.8.2011) 
10 See, inter alia, the observations of the KMK (Conference of Education Ministers) (2005) on the 
educational standards of the Conference of Education Ministers and the 260-page-long survey 
on the ―promotion of social, moral and democratic competencies‖ (Becker, 2008). 
11 Klein (2010).  
  
Moral competence and the democratic way of living 
 
 
572 
of the society Bildung und Wissen (Education and Knowledge) fears even a decline 
in the level of education12. This problem also applies to the concept of moral and 
democratic education. There is a great deal of cloudiness as to what it means and 
to how its effects can be measured13. Competencies are more than conscious 
subject knowledge, which can be verbalized. They include also tacit knowledge, 
which we characterize in everyday life as emotional knowledge, gut feeling or 
emotional intelligence14. When we make important decisions we ultimately decide in 
accordance with our feelings, particularly when taking the decision is an urgent 
matter and we have little time available for reflection and the collection of infor-
mation. Even when we have time we still listen first to our inner voice before making 
our choice. Our feelings enable us to make quick and sometimes even better 
decisions on both technical and moral questions than if we took the time for careful 
reflection15.  
 
However, conscious reasoning and subject knowledge are also important for 
democratic life. Reason is not just the wagging tail of emotions, as some 
psychologists seem to believe16. We depend on them for at least two reasons. First, 
we need them when our feelings fail us, for example when they suggest 
contradictory decisions (i.e. when we are in a dilemma), when they are ambiguous 
or when we are about to do something which brings our moral sense into play. In the 
shape of (self-)critical thinking it prevents us from doing or saying everything that 
occurs to us spontaneously or what we are ordered to do by others17. Second, 
reason and conscious reflection have the important task to shape and educate our 
feelings so that our feelings allow us to make the right decisions when we need 
them, especially when we are under pressure to decide quickly18. A sportsman, for 
example a javelin thrower, can train his emotional reactions so perfectly that he 
intuitively makes the right decision when he throws the javelin. At this moment 
reflection would tend to disturb him. But he would have no chance to throw well, if 
                                                 
12 Lind (2004b; 2004c; 2011c). 
13 A few authors touch on the question of how moral-democratic competence can be defined 
and validly measured (Tiedemann, 2011). But most authors do not even mention this problem 
(see, e.g., Becker, 2008; KMK, 2009) 
14 Goleman (1996). In schools both competencies are mostly again reduced to conscious 
conceptual knowledge, which has to be acquired, just as practice often only means theory of 
practice and not practice itself.  
15 Gigerenzer (2008). 
16 Haidt (2001). 
17 Achtziger et al. (2010). 
18 Lind (1989a). Even undesired emotional reactions such as prejudice can disappear when the 
feelings responsible for them are given the opportunity to develop further. (Wasel, 1996). 
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he and his trainer had not continuously reflected on ways of improving his throwing 
technique by means of suitable exercises.  
 
The situation is similar in the moral sphere. We also make moral decisions mostly in 
accordance with our feelings19. Moral feelings allow us to decide quickly and to act 
resolutely. But here too feelings can be deceptive or place us on the horns of a 
dilemma, so that conscious moral thinking is called for in order to correct moral gut 
feelings. Conscious, professionally schooled thinking is also necessary in order to train 
our moral feelings. Just as the javelin thrower needs an elaborate training program in 
order to be able to rely in the decisive moment on his feelings about his movements, 
so must we also develop and shape our moral feelings so that we can rely on them 
when we have to make quick decisions. Just as the development of sporting skills 
requires a trainer and other professional helpers, so too the development of moral-
democratic competencies (virtues in the Socratic sense) needs the help of 
competent helpers, that is, of parents, good friends and, above all, teachers. As 
research has shown, biological age alone has just as little effect as genetic 
disposition20. Opportunities must be provided for the assumption of responsibility and 
also guided reflection, in order to develop these competencies21.  
 
Moral-democratic competence is indispensible for mastering life in a democratic 
society and, to cope with the tasks and problems we encounter in our personal 
surroundings (family, friends, neighbors, etc.), professions and public life. We can 
never know precisely which tasks life in general and the private lives of each and 
every one of us will bring. Therefore, subject knowledge alone cannot achieve to do 
this, not only because it quickly becomes obsolete in our day and age, but, above 
all, because our decisions and our well-being in everyday life depend not only on 
concepts and theories, but also on our moral feelings. 
 
Two moral-democratic core competencies are particularly important: firstly the 
moral capacity of all citizens to judge and act in accordance with their own moral 
principles22 and, secondly, the moral capacity to solve conflicts by means of fear-
free dialogues instead of by violence or the exercise of power23. ―The moral solution 
of conflicts of action excludes the manifest employment of force as well as ‗cheap‘ 
compromises; it can be understood as a continuation of communicative action – 
                                                 
19 Moll et al., (2002); Haidt (2003); Prehn et al. (2008). 
20 Lind (2002); Rest & Thoma (1985). 
21 Lind (2000; 2002); Schillinger (2006); Lupu (2009); Saeidi (2010). 
22 ―The capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal 
principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments" (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 425) 
23 Habermas (1983); Apel (1990); Lind (1987; 2006b; 2011c; Sen (2010). 
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that is action oriented to reaching understanding – with discursive means‖24. In order 
to overcome violence and war, the Dalai Lama states, we need ―a century of 
dialogue‖25. 
 
On the measurement of moral judgmental and discourse competence 
 
If we want to test any assumption about the nature of moral competence or about 
the efficacy of certain teaching methods, we need to be able to measure it. 
Otherwise, all our assumptions are solely unproven beliefs and the effects of moral 
education are uncertain. This is easier said than done. A person‘s moral competence 
is obviously more difficult to measure than his or her knowledge of moral norms and 
duties. We can rather easily find out which moral rules schoolchildren know or don‘t 
know. But it is much more difficult (and sometimes even impossible) to grasp directly 
their ability to behave in a moral way. On the one hand, many competencies – such 
as for example the ability to take on responsibility – elude detection, as they only 
manifest themselves in real situations later in life. Only when one is really responsible 
for something is it possible to show how capable one is of bearing this responsibility. 
Or the competence can only be revealed in forms of behavior which can only be 
observed in serious situations, but these cannot, for ethical and practical reasons, be 
subjected to testing and control. It is true that in the past experiments have been 
carried out to test the ability of students to resist the temptation to violate a rule or to 
break a law26. But such experiments are controversial for ethical reasons (they 
involved immoral tasks as deception themselves) as well as for scientific reasons, as 
in these experiments one does not measure the participants‘ moral functioning but 
the conformity of isolated acts to external standards.27  
 
An even greater problem, however, is perhaps that the measurement of 
competencies requires a precise knowledge of their nature, which we do not have 
in many areas, and experimental diagnostic techniques whose development calls 
for creativity, time and money28. Attempts to ignore these preconditions and, 
                                                 
24 Habermas (1983), p. 74. 
25 Focus, 13.4.2011, http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/seattle-dalai-lama-will-jahrhundert-des-
dialogs_aid_294793.html. (12.9.11) 
26 Hartshorne & May (1928). 
27 Pittel & Mendelsohn (1966). See also the insightful reflection by some of the most prominent 
experimenters in this field, namely Hartshorne and May (1928): ―It is not the quality of the isolated 
act which distinguishes the good man from the bad, but the quality of the man as an organized 
and socially functioning self" (p. 413 – the very last sentence of the book). 
28 The development and validation of the Moral Judgment Test (MJT), which is dealt with below, 
took several years, as at the same time the nature and development of moral behavior was 
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instead, to come to grips with the competencies by means of subjective personal 
assessments and indirect indicators can lead to serious misjudgments and wrong 
measures in educational policy even when the collection of such data is ―backed 
up‖ by test statistics29.  
 
Because of these difficulties, the measurement of moral and discourse competence 
has only been thematized in science during the last few decades. Until a few years 
ago there were no instruments for the measurement of competencies in these areas. 
One had to be satisfied instead with the assessments of experts and teachers. But 
this was not a satisfactory solution as the criteria for these assessments remain 
obscure. Psychological research has provided numerous proofs that such 
assessments are strongly influenced by the ―overall impression‖ of the test subjects or 
the belief in certain theories. Another approach was to measure moral competence 
by the behavior of people in accordance with external standards. This however, only 
measured norm conformity and not the ability of people to judge and act in 
conformity with their own moral principles30. The earliest scientific endeavors to find 
an adequate way of measuring moral competence, for example those undertaken 
by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, were based on interviews which were 
assessed by researchers on the basis of carefully chosen coding instructions. These 
assessments are often very elaborate and time-consuming and still not free of 
distortion in favor of the theories of the scientists involved31. 
 
In order to provide a valid instrument for research and program evaluation, 35 years 
ago we, a group of researchers at the University of Konstanz, developed the first 
objective test for the measurement of moral-democratic competence, the Moral 
Judgment Test (MJT; Lind, 1978). The MJT can be objectively evaluated. Completion 
and evaluation require only little time, so it is also well-suited for testing the 
effectiveness of teaching methods. We have also developed a convenient online 
version which has been frequently used. It is time-saving and inexpensive and hence 
suitable for self-evaluation of lessons by teachers, especially as it only involves a small 
amount of additional work. In the meantime the MJT has been translated into almost 
40 languages and is used world-wide in research and efficacy studies32. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
subject to further research and consequently a new experimental measurement method had to 
be developed. (Lind, 1978; 1982; 2002; 2004b; 2008c; Weiß & Zierer, 2010). 
29 Linn (2000); Amrein & Berliner (2002); Jahnke & Meyerhöfer (2006); Lind (2004c; 2011c). 
30 Pittel & Mendelsohn (1966). 
31 Lind (1989b). 
32 Lind (1978; 2008c). 
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The MJT is not a test in the customary sense. It is a multivariate behavior experiment 
in the form of a questionnaire. Whereas in the customary tests an attempt is made to 
minimize individual features (so-called structural characteristics) by treating them as 
―measurement errors‖ and thus failing to take them into account, in experimental 
questionnaires it is precisely the structural differences in individual behavior which are 
of central importance33. In the MJT the participants have to evaluate the decision of 
the protagonists in dilemma stories and the arguments for and against their decisions 
(on a nine-point scale ranging from ―I reject this completely‖ to ―I entirely agree‖). 
But the evaluation of their moral judgmental competence does not depend on 
―right‖ or ―wrong‖ answers, or on the evaluation of the individual arguments. What 
counts is the overall answer pattern of the participant. Because of the special 
construction of the MJT it is possible to judge how strongly the subject based his 
assessments on the moral quality of the arguments presented and how strongly he 
took other aspects of the arguments into account, for example, how far the 
arguments corresponded to his own opinion on the case. We know from numerous 
studies that most people are guided in the assessment of arguments by ―opinion 
conformity‖ (i.e. agree to all arguments which coincide with their own opinion and 
reject those which contradict their own opinion) and in controversial discussions are 
scarcely capable of judging arguments according to their moral quality. For 
democracy as discussion, i.e. for the solution of conflicts by means of peaceful, non-
violent discourse, it is indispensable that people are in a position to weigh up the 
arguments of opponents from a moral point of view instead of rejecting them lock, 
stock and barrel.  
 
The MJT stands in contrast to approaches which attempt to assess moral 
competence by enquiring about attitudes and values, i.e. indirectly, and with other 
approaches in which action alternatives are given in dilemma situations, between 
which the subject has to choose. In the first case no valid measurement is possible, 
as what is measured is not a competence. The second approach is problematic in 
terms of the ethical aspects of research, as the researcher applies his own subjective 
standards on morality in the assessment of the test answers but does not measure 
whether the subject has been guided by his own moral standards. In his 
comprehensive study of the literature on the efficacy of teaching in philosophy and 
ethics, the ethics educationalist Markus Tiedemann comes consequently to the 
conclusion ―that it has hitherto not been possible to assess ethical powers of 
judgments in an empirically satisfactory way‖34. However, he excludes the MJT 
                                                 
33 Lind (1982; 2008a). 
34 Tiedemann (2011). 
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explicitly from this verdict, as he had only learned about it after the completion of his 
study, and in fact regards it as an adequate approach35.  
 
The significance of moral democratic competence for life in schools and 
civil society 
 
As many studies have shown, moral democratic competence plays a key role in the 
building and maintenance of civil society: It seems that the development of this 
competence plays an important part in cooperative, pro-social behavior and in the 
ability to deal with conflict and to make decisions36. It helps to prevent criminality37, 
drug consumption38 and the use of violence39. According to the present state of 
research it can be expected that the promotion of moral competence among 
students (and teachers) is also directly beneficial for school learning40 and for the 
social climate in class and in the school community41. It strengthens the ability to 
have one‘s voice heard and to listen to others42. People with high levels of moral 
competence also show a stronger commitment to democracy and freedom43. These 
relationships are not only proved by high correlations. There are also experimental 
indications of causal mechanisms44.  
 
Strengthening moral competence as a task of the school 
 
The co-author of the American constitution and later president of the USA Thomas 
Jefferson (1940) saw the success of the project of a democratic society as being 
closely linked with the quality of its educational system. According to Jefferson a 
high quality education for every citizen is the best means of preventing democracy 
from atrophying and being replaced by an authoritarian regime. The German 
conference of ministers of education (Kultusministerkonferenz, 2008) described 
―Education for Democracy‖ as a central task for schools and the education of 
                                                 
35 Oral communication by Prof. Markus Tiedemann, Freie Universität Berlin, 28.5.2011. 
36 Mansbart (2001); Prehn et al. (2008). 
37 Hemmerling et al. (2009); Hemmerling (in press). 
38 Lenz (2006); Lind (2011c). 
39 Seitz (1991); Lind (2002). 
40 Heidbrink (2010). 
41 Lind (2002; 2009a).  
42 Lind (2008a). 
43 Haan et al. (1968); Gross (1997); Lind et al. (2010). 
44 Further references on the studies cited here can be found in the internet: http://www.uni-
konstanz.de/ag-moral/mut/mjt-references.htm  
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youth45. Strengthening moral democratic competence, in particular, is regarded as 
a task of the schools. In answer to a question of the SPD parliamentary group, for 
example, the Minister for Culture, Youth and Sport of the State of Baden-
Wurttemberg said: 
 
―The promotion of moral and democratic competencies is an essential 
element of the educational reform and hence of the Educational Plan for 
2004, which, in its introduction, formulates central questions on the fields 
―Living in Communities‖ and ―Learning Democracy‖ which are binding… 
Teaching promotes the readiness to accept responsibility and the ability of 
students to make moral and political judgments. Democratic education 
mediates the competence to act, thereby preparing students for 
participation in social and political life. The students learn to take on 
responsibility for themselves and others in social relationships. Living together 
they develop the readiness to respect the rights of others and to understand 
the rules necessary to this end. They learn to respect other opinions and 
attitudes‖46. 
 
Of course parents, the media, friends and other instances can and should also make 
their contributions. But only the school provides the opportunity to promote this 
competence effectively and sustainably among all citizens (inclusion). The school is 
the only institution which is in a position to reach all children and young people and 
to win them for democracy‖ (BLK-Project Demokratie lernen und leben / Project of 
the Federal and State Commission Learning and Living Democracy). Charles Darwin 
(1966) already pointed to the school as the most important place for the promotion 
of moral competence. (As far as we know he was the first person to use the 
concept).  
 
Whether and how far the school contributes or can contribute to the promotion of 
moral competence is, however, a controversial question. Often it is not even asked 
at all. Although many new teaching methods have found their way into teaching, 
some authors deny that the school can have any promotional effect on moral 
judgmental and discourse competence47. As we know from many studies, it is a fact 
that the measurable progress in moral judgmental and discourse competence is 
                                                 
45 KMK (2009).  
46 MKJS (2004). See also: Oberschulamt Freiburg (o.J.): ―Demokratie lernen und leben – ein chan-
cenreicher Auftrag des Bildungsplans‖. http://www.rp.baden-
wuerttemberg.de/servlet/PB/show/1234251/rpf-ref77-chancenreicher%20Auftrag_Demokratie.pdf 
(consulted on 14.8.2011) 
47 Uhl (1986); Schläfli et al. (1985). 
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much smaller and less sustainable than it could be48. Students seldom have the 
opportunity to accept responsibility for their actions and to experience a demo-
cratic, respectful discussion on controversial topics49. In this respect there is a sub-
stantial need in our schools (and not only there) to catch up50. As we have seen, we 
do not need to mediate any values51 to people – most if not all people have basic 
moral values. We must, however, help them to apply these values in daily life and to 
develop the skill they need, i.e. moral competence. In the past the teaching of 
democracy (political and civic education studies) and ethics was mostly restricted 
to the mediation of conceptual knowledge, i.e. to declarative knowledge of laws, 
theories and institutions. This education limited to verbal knowledge of democratic 
ideals is not sufficient, as we have been warned by Gustav Radbruch, a philosopher 
of law who has substantially and sustainably influenced our modern legal system. 
According to Radbruch the school must make it possible for students to experience 
democracy – not only democracy as a form of government with its institutions but 
also, and above all, democracy as a form of life and as discussion. Enabling students 
to experience self-determination and moral-democratic ways of dealing with others 
in an atmosphere free of compulsion and fear is one of the core tasks of education 
in and for democracy. In the teaching of politics and ethics attempts have, 
therefore, been made in recent years to overcome the restriction of the curricula in 
these subjects to the learning of the knowledge in books. Procedural action 
knowledge – which was previously ignored – and the emotional affective side of 
moral democratic behavior are being increasingly emphasized.  
 
In this context there are two very different approaches to making democracy 
experiencable, namely in relation to democracy as a governmental form and to 
                                                 
48 Lind (2002; 2009a; 2009b). 
49 In KMDD lessons I regularly ask students whether they have discussed important problems with 
others (parents, teachers, friends etc.) in the way we had just discussed them, but I usually receive 
only few positive answers. A teacher who was present at a lesson at first expressed doubts about 
the answers of the student but after a pause for thought she admitted that the discussions 
normally took a completely different course. 
50 Lind (2006b). 
51 The concept of ―value‖ is ambiguous. It not only means moral basic values or moral principles, 
as is the case here, but also a variety of attitudes and opinions which are clearly private or 
culture-specific in nature and which are protected by the democratic basic law of freedom of 
opinion and conscience from state interference. This distinction is very important and must also 
be respected by schools. We must guard against mediating basic values to people who already 
possess them, and private and cultural values in areas over which the state has no rights.  
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democracy as a life form. In regard to the understanding of democracy as a form of 
government (separation of powers, elections, parliamentarism, majority decision-
taking, etc.) the school can only succeed in promoting democratic attitudes and 
abilities if it itself adopts (at least in part) the governmental forms valid in society. It is 
only through democratic school assemblies and the participation of students in 
decisions at school, it is argued, that children can experience what democracy is 
and experience this form of government in a convincing way.  
 
The great difficulty with this approach lies in the fact that in a formally democratic 
school the children can learn democracy as a form of government but not always 
as a form of life. This is the case, above all, because the transfer of a democratic 
governmental form assumes such a high degree of moral competence among all 
the participants (students, teachers, school administrators, legislators and voters) that 
it often meets with resistance. This can be illustrated by the fate of the SMV 
(Schülermitverantwortung / school council) and the still very limited dissemination of 
―democratic schools‖52. The SMV‘s, which the occupying powers had introduced 
into the then West Zone after the Second World War, and the majority of the 
supporters of the ―democratic school‖ movement were guided by the idea that 
students would learn democracy if they experience certain forms of political 
participation in school affairs. Another prominent example of this idea in Germany is 
the nationwide model project ―Demokratie lernen und leben‖ (Learning and living 
democracy, 2002-2006) financed by the Bund-Länder Kommission (Federal 
Government/Federal States Commission for Educational Planning), which aimed at 
the mediation of democratic values. By creating opportunities for students to 
participate in lessons and school life ―the readiness of young people to take an 
active part in civil society‖ was to be promoted53. The evaluation of this project by 
the German Institute for International Educational Research (DIPF)54 revealed an 
increase in the readiness to participate and more positive attitudes towards 
democracy among the participants. The possibility that such projects also promote 
competence cannot be excluded. But no efficacy studies exist to demonstrate this.  
 
One of the few approaches whose efficacy has been empirically evaluated by 
means of intervention studies is the Just Community approach of Lawrence Kohlberg 
                                                 
52 Huang (2009); Backhaus & Knorre (2008). 
53 My emphasis; GL. 
54 Unfortunately it is no longer available in the internet. http://blk-
demokratie.de/programm/externe-evaluation.html. Other links to this study 
(http://193.175.239.23/ows-bin/owa/r.einzeldok?doknr=36040) are also no longer valid (Consulted 
on 17.8.2011) 
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and his colleagues55. In spite of the great efforts undertaken and the large degree of 
acceptance by the students and teachers this approach proved to have had little 
effect on the promotion of moral judgmental competence. ―The studies we have 
examined which linked moral development to social studies and history seem to 
have brought about scarcely any real change in the moral judgmental 
competence‖, writes Ann Higgins, one of the leading scholars in this field56. In their 
large-scale Just Community project in New York Power, Higgins and Kohlberg found 
only a very weak effect after a year57. The slight increase in test scores (9.50 MMS-
points) is all the more disappointing as control students from traditional schools with 
no Just Community revealed a higher increase in the same period (15.25)58. In the 
Just Community project carried out at three German schools, the DES Project59, a 
very clear growth in judgmental competence was established after a period of 
about 2.5 years60. The project also revealed a reduction in dysfunctional behavior. 
But even when effects were recognized they could not be clearly attributed to the 
democratization of the school, as dilemma discussions were also carried out at the 
same time in all of these projects. As we know how effective dilemma discussions 
are, the possibility cannot be excluded that these led to the increase in test values 
and not so much the Just Community program.  
 
This sobering realization has led me to rethink fundamentally the previous 
approaches to moral-democratic education. In view of the ineffectiveness of many 
of these approaches I have become convinced that democracy as a life form can 
be achieved more quickly and effectively in schools and society if one takes the 
individual as the starting point and undertakes fitting means to promote moral 
competence directly. According to everything we know, fundamental trust in 
democracy as a life form arises in young people (and adults): 
 
a) when they deal respectfully with each other and can practice and experience 
a discursive, non-violent solution of problems; 
b) when they experience themselves as enjoying equal rights and see that their 
opinion counts just as much as anyone else‘s and that power and status do not 
decide on access to information.  
                                                 
55 Power et al. (1989); Oser & Althof (1994); Lind (2002; 2009); 
56 Higgins (1980), p. 106. 
57 "The results indicated a modest developmental change only in the two democratic high 
schools with teaching staffs explicitly committed to the just community approach" (Power et al., 
1989, S. 297). 
58 Power et al. (1989), p. 279. 
59 Lind & Raschert (1986); Oser & Althof (1994); Lind (2002). 
60 Lind (2002), p. 180. 
  
Moral competence and the democratic way of living 
 
 
582 
Being able to experience these things is a question of the opportunity offered to 
young people and of their individual ability to grasp and use this opportunity. It is, 
therefore, very important for the effectiveness of teaching that the opportunities 
provided for moral-democratic learning are well adjusted to the individual abilities. 
Precisely this is achieved by the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion, which we 
developed over the past twenty years. 
 
The promotion of moral competence with the Konstanz Method of 
Dilemma Discussion (KMDD)®  
 
The main aim of the KMDD is the promotion of moral-democratic competence. Put 
simply this means the furtherance of the ability to stand up for one‘s own point of 
view and of the capacity to listen to others when important issues are at stake, 
important to oneself or to another person. This also means the ability to look for and 
to maintain communication with others when strong moral feelings are involved on 
both sides. This competence is fundamental for the individual ability to solve 
problems and conflicts under pressure, to make decisions, to learn from experience 
and, above all, to cooperate with other people and to be a productive member of 
civil society (see below). As research has shown, the existing degree of this 
competence differs from person to person. In most people it is only weakly 
developed. They find it very difficult to engage in a dialogue with others when their 
counterpart expresses a different opinion or presents himself as an opponent61. This 
competence does not develop simply as a result of biological maturation and 
growing older, or under pressure from the social milieu, but evidently only when 
certain learning opportunities are given or society (in the shape of its educational 
institutions) provides such learning opportunities, either intentionally or by chance62. 
 
It is not only difficult to measure competencies but also to further them in a 
purposeful manner, as their promotion cannot be restricted to the transmission of 
subject knowledge but must involve applying this knowledge and taking on 
responsibility for the validity of this knowledge, as well as feelings and real 
experience. Competencies can only be acquired by active doing (Dewey). As with 
competence in general the difficulty in mediating moral competence consists in 
developing suitable tasks and exercise types which encourage students to act in a 
moral-democratic way. A further problem with moral-democratic educational aims 
is that the teaching methods (the active doing of the teacher) must be in keeping 
                                                 
61 Keasey (1974); Habermas (1983); Lind (2002). 
62 Rest & Thomas (1985); Lind (2000; 2002); Schillinger (2006); Lupu (2009); Saeidi (2011). 
  
Europe’s Journal of Psychology 
 
 
583 
with these aims. Self-determination cannot be taught with compulsory methods63. 
The ability to behave in accordance with inner moral principles cannot be tested by 
external standards. The active doing of learners should not be prevented by 
excessive activity on the part of the teacher.  
 
The KMDD has similarities with vaccination against virus infections. Just as in the case 
of vaccination, when the organism is confronted with real but weakened viruses in 
order to stimulate its ability to survive an actual virus attack, so too in the KMDD the 
students are confronted for learning purposes with the task of entering into a moral 
discourse on a moral dilemma with different-minded students and of giving 
arguments to convince them of their own opinion on the dilemma.  
 
Alternating phases of support and challenge during a 90-minute KMDD session 
ensure that the moral feelings of the participants evoked by the controversy are kept 
within an optimal range. To this end special ―educative‖ dilemmas have been 
constructed for KMDD sessions which are highly realistic in form and deal with 
controversial topics, but have fictive persons as their protagonists. KMDD sessions 
have only two rules: firstly, the participants can say everything they wish (except for 
making value judgments on others); secondly, the participants call upon one 
another to make contributions, i.e. there is no discussion leader or moderator. 
Violations of the first rule very rarely occur, but they are more frequent in the case of 
the second rule. In my year-long experience with various age groups, school types 
and cultures, I have found that it is sufficient, when violations occur, to remind the 
participants in a friendly way of the rule in order to guarantee its observation. This 
experience strengthens the assumption that the rules of the KMDD do in fact 
correspond to the moral feelings of most, if not of all people. The participants make 
the experience that all the students and also all the teachers are subject to the 
authority of rules instead of the power of certain persons, in accordance with the 
moral ideal of the ―equal dignity‖64 of all people, and that they do this freely and 
gladly without their being any need for punishment or reward. Participants also 
report that in KMDD sessions they have learned to esteem people with other opinions 
as important and useful sources of inspiration for their own development, and not 
merely to tolerate them.  
 
The KMDD method can be traced back to the work of Blatt and Kohlberg65. This 
method became popular in Germany as a result of the school project Demokratie 
                                                 
63 Portele (1978) fittingly calls this the ―You ought-to-want-to paradox‖. 
64 Juul (1997). 
65 See Reinhardt, S. (1980); Lind & Lind (1984), Lind (1987; 1989a; 1993); Lind & Raschert (1987). 
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und Erziehung in der Schule (DES / Democracy and Education in Schools) carried out 
in North Rhine-Westphalia (from 1985 to 1991), which I had initiated and led 
(together with Jürgen Raschert)66. The Kohlberg method turned out to be more 
effective than all the hitherto known teaching methods. Its effectiveness seemed to 
me, however, to be capable of improvement67. On the basis of the experience 
made with the DES project I have further developed the Blatt-Kohlberg method and 
have considerably increased its efficacy over the last twenty years. In this way the 
Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD)® was born, which is described in 
more detail below.  
 
The KMDD is based on the insight that an effective, sustainable and, for society, 
functional promotion of moral competence can only succeed68 when: 
a. moral learning is made possible through the positive experience of equal 
dignity, i.e. of genuine freedom of speech and respect and is not (overtly or 
covertly) prevented by teaching methods which run counter to the learning 
goals (the compatibility of aims and means)69,  
b. feelings and emotions are competently and responsibly integrated into the 
learning process by the teacher (the professionality principle), 
c. students and teachers have the opportunity to receive objective, intelligible 
and undistorted feedback on their learning gains (the self-evaluation 
principle), 
d. all students are furthered and inequality of opportunity for civic participation is 
compensated for (the inclusion principle). 
 
The KMDD is one of the few educational methods whose efficacy has been 
scientifically tested by means of intervention studies with before-and-after 
investigations and comparative analyses. It has been shown that the moral-
democratic competence of people can be very effectively promoted with the 
KMDD method: Even after only a few KMDD lessons the recorded effect size is far 
higher than the customary effect sizes (r > 0.5 bzw. d > 1.20)70. In addition, numerous 
                                                 
66 Lind, G. & Raschert, J. (1987). Lind, G. (1993; 2004a; 2008a). Oser, F. & Althof, W. (1994). 
67 Lind (1994; 2002; 2009a). 
68 For an introduction see: Lind, G. (2009). ―Moral ist lehrbar – Handbuch zur Theorie und Praxis 
moralischer und demokratischer Bildung.‖ München: Oldenbourg (2. edn.) 
69 The phenomenon of the ―hidden curriculum‖ referred to by Jackson (1967). 
70 The effect sizes are far greater than the values of other methods. A value of r = 0.3 is regarded 
by some as a threshold. On the conception and evaluation of the KMDD see http://www.uni-
konstanz.de/ag-moral/moral/kmdd-references.htm 
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reports of participants are available in the internet which give an impression of the 
acceptance and confirmed effectiveness of the KMDD71. 
 
The KMDD is well received by the participants not only because students usually 
enjoy discussing and because these sessions bring variety into everyday life at 
school. The students are also very much impressed by the good discussion culture. 
―We could really argue about something without it immediately becoming personal 
and causing aggression, as it usually does‖ was the judgment of a ten-year-old girl. 
Many participants judge their experience with KMDD lessons in a similar way. A 
number of media reports and video documentations on the KMDD exist72. 
 
The KMDD has the following characteristics:  
- It can be employed in all subjects and also in interdisciplinary teaching;  
- Its efficacy is continuously self-evaluated with anonymous before-and-after tests 
through the ITSE program73. ITSE stands for Improvement of Teaching through 
Self-Evaluation. ITSE is an integral part of the KMDD and of the training to 
become a KMDD teacher. This assessment serves to assure both the quality of 
the teachers‘ work and the further development of the method. The anonymity 
of the data collection prevents the ―inevitable corruption‖ of person-related 
evaluations74. Composite anonymous data serve as the basis for the evaluation 
and further development of the KMDD; 
 - Clinical supervision by colleagues is also an integral part of the KMDD and of 
the training to become a KMDD teacher. It is an important element in internal 
further education in schools and of quality assurance and it serves as a 
―window‖ to the outside world (other teaching staff, society), thus opening up 
the project to the society outside; 
 - The core of the examination and certification of KMDD teachers is the 
assessment of a ―best practice video‖ by two experts. Here the candidate can 
demonstrate that he has a sovereign command of the method. The 
examination by means of a video is comparatively valid for the profession and 
fair. It is largely independent of indispositions resulting from examinations of the 
candidate, his class and the examiner, and can be tested by third persons in 
the event of objections. This part of the test can be repeated. There is no 
graded marking. In addition, a learning portfolio with brief reports on lessons, 
efficacy studies and reflections on one‘s own training is required.  
                                                 
71 http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/moral/KMDD_rueckmeldung_teilnehmer.htm  
72 http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/moral/KMDD_rueckmeldung_medien.htm  
73 http://www.uni-konstanz.de/ag-moral/evaluation/itse_home.htm 
74 ―Campbell‘s law‖; see Campbell (1978); Amrein & Berliner (2002); Nichols & Berliner (2006); Lind 
(2004c; 2011c). 
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It can often be observed that teachers who use the KMDD change their entire 
behavior in their teaching. It seems that the KMDD ―rubs off‖. This is a thoroughly 
desirable effect of the KMDD. The KMDD can be used in all school types (from grade 
three onwards) and also in other non-school educational institutions, at home and 
abroad75.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Democracy is a high moral ideal of most people worldwide. Regardless of culture, 
religion, age, social class, gender etc., most if not all people have high moral ideals 
and principles. But we also know that these are not sufficient in view of the 
complexity of everyday life for people to make decisions which accord with these 
ideals in every situation. To this end we have to develop a special ability which we 
have characterized here as moral competence. As the research shows, this 
competence can scarcely develop of its own accord, but requires encouragement 
by the institutions of society – parents, siblings, friends, media etc. and especially by 
the schools. The Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion provides schools with a 
method with which they can promote moral-democratic competence very 
effectively and which can be easily integrated into the curriculum of all subjects. In 
order to be effective, however, this method requires a thorough training in its use76.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Non-school educational institutions in which the KMDD has hitherto be employed: in the 
German Armed Forces (Bergmann, 2007), in prisons (Hemmerling, in press), in university didactics 
at the University of Konstanz, in medical training (Medical School of Monterrey/Mexiko, 
Universidad de Sao Paulo/Brazil, Universidad de Chile), at an interdisciplinary level in the 
Universidad de Monterrey/Mexico, in the training of ethics teachers at the University of 
Poznan/Poland, at the Universities of Applied Sciences for Social Work in Berlin and Zurich and at 
the University of Applied Sciences: Special Needs Education in Zurich. 
76 A detailed presentation of the theory and implementation of the KMDD can be found, inter 
alia, in my book ―Moral ist lehrbar‖76 and on the following website: http://www.uni-
konstanz.de/ag-moral/. An account is also given there of the similarities and differences between 
the KMDD and other methods of moral and democratic education, such as the Kohlberg 
method, role-playing, debating clubs, etc.  
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